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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t] he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."' This consti-
tutional protection "governs all seizures of the person,2 by a law en-
forcement officer and "requires that the seizure be reasonable. 3
However, every encounter between law enforcement officers and
citizens is not necessarily a seizure protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.4 Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure only occurs when
"the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."5 Seizure does not occur
"[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the
police and go about his business.' 6  If a police/citizen encounter
does not rise to the level of a seizure, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are not triggered,7 and the police do not need objective
justification for interacting with the citizen in this fashion.8
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980) (plurality opinion).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
4 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (stating that some encounters between
policemen and citizens do not involve a seizure).
5 Id.
6 Florida v. Bostick, 502 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
628 (1991)).
7 See id. (asserting that Fourth Amendment issues do not arise unless the police/citizen en-
counter "loses its consensual nature" and becomes a seizure).
' See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (concluding that objective
justification is not needed to justify contact between the police and a citizen so long as the indi-
vidual citizen is free to walk away).
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Although the determination of seizure plays an important role in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there is a circuit split about
whether a trial court or appellate court bears sole responsibility for
deciding this issue. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits all hold that trial courts are responsible for making this deci-
sion, and will only reverse when the decision is clearly erroneous. On
the other hand, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits all hold that appellate courts bear sole responsibility for
deciding this issue and will review the trial court's decision de novo.
The source of this disagreement is that the determination of sei-
zure is a mixed question of "fact and law"9 and there is no consistent
appellate standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law. l°
Some mixed questions are treated as matters of law that are reviewed
de novo,1 whereas others are treated as matters of fact that are re-
viewed for clear error. 12 The decision about which standard of appel-
late review applies usually depends on "a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."is
In this Comment, I will argue that the appropriate appellate stan-
dard of review for seizure should be de novo, and that appellate
courts should not defer to a trial court's decision about whether a sei-
zure occurred. My argument is based on the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Ornelas v. United States, which offered three justifications for
reviewing4 probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations
de novo. All three of these reasons are equally applicable to deter-
mining whether a seizure occurred, so the appellate standard of re-
view for seizure should also be de novo.15
9 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
'o See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1991) (discussing different appellate
standards of review for mixed questions of law and fact).
" See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999) (concluding that determination of
whether the admissibility of hearsay statement violates the Confrontation Clause should be re-
viewed de novo).
2 See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988) (concluding that the determina-
tion of fees in Equal Access to Justice Act cases should be reviewed for clear error ("abuse of
discretion")).
" Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
14 517 U.S. 690, 691, 697-700 (1996) (holding that appellate courts should review probable
cause and reasonable suspicion determinations de novo).
"5 Some circuit courts have cited Ornelas as authority for reviewing seizure determinations de
novo. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). But the use of Orne-
las as authority for de novo appellate review of seizure is controversial and this practice has gen-
erated a circuit split. Compare United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2003) (ar-
guing that Ornelas does not overrule prior circuit precedent that appellate review of seizure is
for clear error), with United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing the
relevance of Ornelas to appellate review of seizure and relying on it to justify de novo review).
Since Ornelas deals with probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and not seizure, it is doubtful
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The first part of this Comment analyzes the various factors consid-
ered when determining the appropriate appellate standard of review.
Section A examines the difference between the clearly erroneous and
de novo standards of appellate review. Section B discusses the role of
the fact/law distinction in determining whether an appellate court
will use the clearly erroneous or de novo standard of review. Section
C explores the difficulties presented by issues that are mixed ques-
tions of fact and law, and the absence of any unitary standard of ap-
pellate review for mixed questions of fact and law.
The second part of this Comment explores the concept of seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and the circuit split over appellate re-
view. Section A examines the two-part test employed by trial courts in
determining whether a seizure has occurred, and the characterization
of seizure as a mixed question of fact and law. Section B discusses the
reasons offered by some circuit courts for applying the clearly erro-
neous standard in appellate review of seizure. Section C discusses the
reasons offered by other circuit courts in support of de novo appel-
late review of seizure. Both sets of arguments are fairly plausible, and
when considered in isolation, there appears to be little incentive to
favor one over the other.
The third part of this Comment resolves this quandary by focusing
on Ornelas v. United States, and the similarities between the concepts
of seizure, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion. Section A ex-
amines the holding of Ornelas, and the three reasons offered by the
Supreme Court for applying de novo appellate review to determina-
tions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Although it is un-
certain whether Ornelas is binding precedential authority with respect
to seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Section B argues that simi-
lar reasons exist for using de novo appellate review for seizure.
I. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards of Review
If a criminal case reaches an appellate court and involves a dispute
over whether an individual was seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the first question raised is: What standard of review
should be used in assessing the lower court's ruling? 6 The term
that it serves as direct authority for using de novo appellate review for determinations of sei-
zure. In this Comment, however, I shall not try to resolve the issue of whether Ornelas serves as
direct authority for reviewing seizure de novo, but simply argue that the rationale employed by
the Supreme Court in Orne/as is equally applicable to seizure.
16 See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.7(c), at 436 (4th ed. 2004).
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"standard of review" refers to the "level of deference that the appeals
court will give to the findings" 7 and conclusions of the lower court.
Broadly speaking, there are four different standards of review em-
ployed in criminal appeals: clearly erroneous, substantial evidence,
de novo, and abuse of discretion. 8 For this Comment, I will only fo-
cus on the standards of review relevant to the circuit split on Fourth
Amendment seizure: clear error and de novo.
The clearly erroneous standard is well established as the appellate
standard of review applied to the trial court's findings of fact in
Fourth Amendment suppression motions.' 9 Findings of fact are those
that "generally respond to inquiries about who, when, what and
where. ,20 These findings are generally regarded as entailing the em-
pirical-such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, ex-
isting, 2or taking place-as well as the subjective-such as state of
mind.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted. 2 2 If the evidence supports more than one conclusion, a choice
23between two permissible views is not clear error, and an appellate
court may not reject the trial court's findings simply because it might
have "decided the case differently.
24
The de novo standard aV'plies to appellate review of the trial
court's determinations of law. Law consists of "those rules and stan-
dards of general application by which the state regulates human af-
fairs."26 These rules and standards should be "generally and uni-
formly applicable to all persons of like qualities and status and in like
17 Martha S. Davis & Stevan Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals: Fifth Cir-
cuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REv. 461, 464 (1986).
,s See id. at 466 (identifying the four standards of criminal appellate review).
6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 438.
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985).
"' Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 231, 236
(1991) (discussing definitions of fact offered by academics).
7' Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285 n.14 (1982) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 (1963) (applying "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review to non-guilt findings of fact in criminal cases).
21 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) ("Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erro-
neous.").
Id. at 573.
See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 440 ("The second category concerns appellate review of the
trial court's determinations of law.... ."); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 947-49 (1995) (concluding that de novo standard of appellate review is appropriate
for trial court's determination of law); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (stating
that questions of law are reviewable de novo).
Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899, 901 (1943).
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circumstances,, 27 and "'capable of being predicated in advance and
which [being] so predicated, await proof of the facts necessary for
their application.'- 2  Under this standard, the trial court's under-
standing of the law is not entitled to deference, and the appellate
court considers the issue as if it had never been addressed by the trial
court.2
The primary effect of these two different standards of review is to
allocate "adjudicative decisional power and responsibility" 0 between
the trial courts and the appellate courts. If the appellate court em-
ploys a deferential standard of appellate review, such as clear error,
the trial court has primary decision-making power and will only be
reversed if clearly in error. But if the issue is reviewed de novo, the
appellate court bears primary decision-making power over that issue.
Accordingly, a decision about the appropriate appellate standard
has an important effect in deciding which court will ultimately decide
an issue. Unfortunately, there is no decisive rule for choosing the
appropriate standard of review,3 ' and there is substantial disagree-
ment among the circuit courts over the appropriate standard of re-
view for a variety of issues. 2 But the major factor that affects the ap-
pellate standard of review is the fact/law distinction.3
21 Id. at 904.
2' Hofer, supra note 21, at 236-37 (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and
Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111,112 (1924)).
' See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (stating that appellate
courts should independently review trial courts' determinations of state law); see also 9A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing appellate review of conclusions of law); 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 440 (stat-
ing that "determination by the lower court is not entitled to deference").
" Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the 7rial and Appel-
late Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64
N.C. L. REv. 993, 997 (1986).
" Michael E. O'Neill, Note, A Two-Pronged Standard of Appellate Review for Pretrial Bail Determi-
nations, 99 YALE L.J. 885, 895 (1990).
32 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10 (discussing circuit splits over standard of reviews for mixed
questions of law and fact).
" See Brent E. Kidwell, Note, A Nation Divided: By What Standard Should Fourth Amendment
Seizure Findings Be Reviewed on Appeal?, 26 IND. L. REv. 117, 130 (1992) ("The division of labor in
the federal judicial system is determined, in large part, by a conclusory labelling of issues as fac-
tual or legal in nature."); Monaghan, supra note 20, at 234 ("[T]he categories of law and fact
have traditionally served an important regulatory function in distributing authority among vari-
ous decisionmakers in the legal system.").
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B. The Fact/Law Distinction
The fact/law distinction is fundamental in the American legal sys-
tem, 3 4 and can be traced to the Constitution. 5 Despite this pedigree,
the distinction continues to puzzle the courts, and the Supreme• • - • , • 36 , • ,,3'
Court often refers to the distinction as "elusive"'6 and "slippery, and
as having a "vexing nature."3 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized that its decisions on the issue are not "entirely clear,,
39
and that there is no rule or principle that will "unerringly distinguish
a factual finding from a legal conclusion." 4° This difficulty has led
some commentators to reject the fact/law distinction and claim there
is "no essential difference"4 1 between the two categories and that
these categories are "equally expansible and collapsible terms."
Despite this difficulty, the basic fact/law distinction is reasonably
clear,43 and it is only problematic at the edges where the "concepts of
fact and law run into one another to such a degree that it may be dif-
ficult or impossible to pull apart the factual and legal components." 4
These "mixed question [s] of law and fact"' 5 are the most difficult with
respect to the appropriate appellate standard of review and will be
examined below.
More importantly, the fact/law distinction "does quite well in
predicting how appellate courts will review trial level determinations
of 'pure' law and 'pure' or historical fact." If the issue being re-
viewed is classified as a finding of fact, the appellate court will review
for "clear error., 47 If the trial court's judgment is classified as a con-
clusion, or question, of law, then appellate review is "de novo.
"
,4
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1769 (2003) (discussing the law-fact distinction and the different roles it plays in the
legal system).
" See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact. ... ."); id. at amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined .... ),
'6 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995).
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
4' Allen & Pardo, supra note 34, at 1770.
41 Monaghan, supra note 20, at 233 n.24.
,' See supra Part B.
6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 442.
4 Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
Louis, supra note 30, at 1000.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); see also George A. Somerville, Standards of
Appellate Review, in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 16, 23 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992) (stat-
ing that most federal appellate courts apply the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing dis-
trict courts' factual findings).
" Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558.
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Deference to the trial court's findings of fact serves two primary
policy objectives. First, it minimizes the risk of judicial error by as-
signing decision-making responsibility to the court that is best-suited
to make the decision.
[Deference to the trial court's findings of fact] minimizes the risk of ju-
dicial error by assigning primary responsibility for resolving factual dis-
putes to the court in the "superior position" to evaluate and weigh the
evidence-the trial court.... [It] emphasizes that the trial judge's oppor-
tunity to judge the accuracy of witnesses' recollections and make credibil-
ity determinations in cases in which live testimony is presented gives him
a significant advantage over appellate judges in evaluating and weighing
the evidence.49
Second, it conserves judicial resources because appellate courts are
not required to engage in full-scale independent reviews of all aspects
of the trial courts' judgments.
Because under the clearly erroneous test, the reviewing court will affirm
the trial court's determinations unless it "is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed," it is relieved of the bur-
den of a full-scale independent review and evaluation of the evidence.
Consequently, valuable appellate resources are conserved for those issues
that appellate courts in turn are best situated to decide.50
Furthermore, these same policy objectives are satisfied by having
appellate courts review trial courts' determinations of law de novo.
First, the risk of judicial error is minimized because appellate courts
are better suited than trial courts for deciding issues of law.
Structurally, appellate courts have several advantages over trial courts in
deciding questions of law. First, appellate judges are freer to concentrate
on legal questions because they are not encumbered, as are trial judges,
by the vital, but time-consuming, process of hearing evidence. Second,
the judgment of at least three members of an appellate panel is brought
to bear on every case. It stands to reason that the collaborative, delibera-
tive process of appellate courts reduces the risk of judicial error on ques-
tions of law. Thus, de novo review of questions of law, like clearly erro-
neous review of questions of fact, serves to minimize judicial error by
assigning to the court best positioned to decide the issue the primary re-
51sponsibility for doing so.
Second, judicial resources are conserved because an appellate court's
decision has precedential value and ensures the correct application
of the law in future cases.
" United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omit-
ted); see also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 440 (identifying United States v. McConney as the "leading
case" on policy rationale for deferential appellate review).
McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201.
Id.
Feb. 2007]
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De novo review of questions of law, however, is dictated by still another
concern. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, appellate rulings of law be-
come controlling precedent and, consequently, affect the rights of future
litigants. Rulings on factual issues, on the other hand, are generally of
concern only to the immediate litigants. From the standpoint of sound
judicial administration, therefore, it makes sense to concentrate appel-
late resources on ensuring the correctness of determinations of law.
Together, these policy considerations provide logical and com-
plementary reasons for deferential clear error appellate review of
facts, and non-deferential de novo appellate review of law. Trial
courts are experts at finding out facts; therefore it makes sense to
conserve appellate resources and decrease the risk of error by having
appellate courts defer to the trial court's determinations in these ar-
eas. 3 Appellate courts, on the other hand, are experts in identifying
and clarifying the law; therefore non-deferential review of a trial
court's pronouncements of the law decreases the risk of error.54
Although the classification as fact or law determines whether an
issue will be reviewed for clear error or de novo, not all issues can be
classified so easily. One group of issues for which the appropriate
standard of appellate review is particularly problematic is the group
of mixed questions of fact and law. Since the determination of
whether a seizure occurred is a mixed question of fact and law, 55 it is
important to analyze the appropriate appellate standard of review for
these types of questions. This standard will be discussed in the next
section.
C. Problems of Mixed Questions of Fact and Law
Mixed questions of law and fact are "questions in which the his-
torical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to
put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the estab-
lished facts is or is not violated. ' ,56 The most widely recognized exam-
ple of a mixed question is negligence, where the judge (or jury) is
"not being asked to determine what happened or what the defendant
did. It is being asked to determine whether the defendant's conduct
,,57was reasonable or fell below the invisible line of due care. Another
52 Id.
, See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101,
103-07 (2005) (analyzing standards of review in terms of judicial efficiency and institutional
expertise).
Id. at 105-06.
6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 446-48 (identifying seizure as a mixed question of fact and
law).
" Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
17 Warner, supra note 53, at 119.
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example is probable cause, where the trial court is asked to deter-
mine whether the "known facts and circumstances are sufficient to
warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found."58
As a general matter, there is substantial disagreement about
whether mixed questions of fact and law are to be reviewed for clear
error or de novo. 59 The problem is that there is no single rule gov-
erning appellate review of all mixed questions;6° instead, courts look
at each mixed question individually to determine the appropriate
61standard of appellate review.
When deciding whether a particular mixed question warrants de
novo or deferential review, the Supreme Court advocates looking at
which institution is more competent and better suited to deciding the
issue:
We recently observed, with regard to the problem of determining
whether mixed questions of law and fact are to be treated as questions of
law or of fact for purposes of appellate review, that sometimes the deci-
sion "has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound ad-
ministration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than an-
other to decide the issue in question.
62
Deferential review of questions of mixed law and fact is "warranted
when it appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than the
appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appel-
late scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine."65
Trial courts are better positioned to determine the facts involved
in a particular situation because they have the advantage of hearing
the evidence, observing the demeanor of witnesses, and judging
credibility. 4 Therefore, when a mixed question of fact and law in-
volves an "inquiry that is 'essentially factual,' . . . the concerns of judi-
cial administration will favor the district court, and [then] the district
r Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
See generally Warner, supra note 53, at 107-12 (discussing the circuit split over the appro-
priate appellate standard of review for mixed questions); Lee, supra note 10, passim (analyzing
the arguments behind the circuit split over the appellate standard of review for mixed ques-
tions).
o See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 443 ("[Tihere is no single rule governing all mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.... ."); Warner, supra note 53, at 112 (concluding that the current "policy
approach" towards mixed questions "works for some kinds of mixed questions but not others").
6, Compare Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-62 (1988) (holding that appellate review
of mixed question concerning attorney's fees should be deferential), with Ornelas, 517 U.S. at
698 (holding that appellate review of probable cause is de novo).
6 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559-60 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
62 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991).
,' See DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.* (1974) ("[F]actfinding is the basic
responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts .... ."); see also Heidi M. Westby,
Comment, Fourth Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review, 18 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 829, 836-37 (1992) (clarifying the functional role of trial and appellate courts).
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court's determination should be classified as one offact reviewable under
the clearly erroneous standard. 6 s In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.,
for example, the Court held the clear error standard is appropriate
for reviewing attorney sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure because "the district court is better situated than
the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-
dependent legal standard."
66
Appellate courts, on the other hand, are more competent at iden-
tifying and clarifying the law that has been used by the trial court in
order to ensure that the decision is legally correct.67 This advantage
over trial courts comes from the ability of appellate judges to engage
in "'extended reflection" '68 about the law and the use of "multijudge
panels... that permit reflective dialogue and collective judgment. 6 9
These institutional features allow appellate courts to reflect more
fully about the legal concepts used and the values that "animate" the
law. 7° Therefore, when a mixed question of fact and law primarily in-
volves clarifying the law or ensuring the consistent application of the
71law, it will be better suited to de novo review by the appellate courts.
In Lilly v. Virginia, for example, the Court ruled that de novo review
was appropriate for determining whether a declarant's out-of-court
statement violates the Confrontation Clause because it is necessary
for appellate courts to "'maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal
principles"' governing Bill of Rights protections.
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) ("We rec-
ognized that issue as essentially factual, subject to the clearly-erroneous rule."); Comm'r v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960) ("The nontechnical nature of the statutory standard, the
close relationship of it to the data of practical human experience, and the multiplicity of rele-
vant factual elements ... confirm us in our conclusion that primary weight in this area must be
given to the conclusions of the trier of fact.").
496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990).
67 See Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 232 ("Courts of appeals.., are structurally suited to the col-
laborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy."); Westby, supra note 64, at 836-
37 (stating that appellate courts are superior to trial courts in identifying the law and correcting
errors in law).
s Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 232 (quoting Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of
Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 923
(1989)).
69 Id. (citation omitted).
70 McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202 (stating that appellate courts are adept at identifying legal
concepts and values that "animate" the law).
71 See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999) (plurality opinion) (Stevens,J.) (arguing
that determination of whether admission of a witness's out-of-court statements violate the Con-
frontation Clause should be reviewed de novo because the question does not depend on "in-
court demeanor" or "other factor[s] uniquely suited" to trial court determination); Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (arguing that probable cause and reasonable suspicion
should be subject to de novo review).
n 527 U.S. at 136 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697).
[Vol. 9:3
THE IMPACT OFORNE[AS V. UNITED STATES
The determination of whether a seizure occurred under the
Fourth Amendment is a mixed question of fact and law.73 Unfortu-
nately, it is unclear whether the determination of what constitutes a
seizure falls more within the institutional competence of the trial or
appellate court. This issue will be examined in the next section by
focusing on the arguments made by the circuit courts in favor of both
standards of review.
II. SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Law Governing Fourth Amendment Seizure
"The law regarding the seizure of persons is well developed.
7 4
However, every encounter between law enforcement officers and citi-
zens is not a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.75 Some
encounters are voluntary and do not require protection by the
Fourth Amendment. A voluntary encounter may turn into a seizure
and trigger the Fourth Amendment, which will require officers to ar-
ticulate reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Seizure occurs
"[o] nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of au-
thority, has in some way restrained the liberty of [the] citizen.,
76
This general principle was adapted, by Justice Stewart in United
States v. Mendenhall, into an objective test for determining whether a
seizure has occurred and triggered the Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.77 This test was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in INS
v. Delgado.78
Under this test, an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes "if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."79 If a situation is such that a reasonable person would not be-
lieve that she was free to leave, then this person is seized and the po-
lice must be able to articulate reasonable suspicion or probable cause
for the seizure.
This "reasonable person" standard is objective, and does not de-
pend on the citizen's subjective perceptions or the officer's subjective
7' 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 448 (identifying seizure as mixed question of fact and law).
' United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 2003).
7: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
76 Id.
7 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion) (StewartJ.).
7 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
7' Id.; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (summarizing reasonable
person test); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (using reasonable person test for
seizure); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (same); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 573 (1988) (same).
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intent, but only depends on what the officer's words and actions
would convey to a reasonable and innocent person."0 Therefore, a
citizen subjectively may believe that she was not free to leave without
actually being seized under the Fourth Amendment. All that matters
is whether the officer's actions were such that a reasonable person
would or would not believe that she was free to leave.
Once the trial court has identified the law governing the seizure
determination, it conducts a two-part analysis to determine whether a
seizure actually occurred.8' First, the trial court establishes the facts
and circumstances of the encounter between the citizen and the po-
lice officer. These facts become the findings of historical fact, and
are established through the testimony of various witnesses and judg-
ments about their credibility.
Second, the law is applied to these facts to determine whether the
citizen was seized by the police at this particular time. This is a fact-
intensive process under which the trial court must "consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person
that the person was not free to decline the officer's requests or oth-
erwise terminate the encounter.
8 2
If an appellate court reviews the first step of the trial court's analy-
sis, then the standard of review is perfectly clear."' The lower court's
findings of fact about the circumstances of the citizen-police encoun-
ter are reviewed "for clear error."
8 4
The real problem occurs at the second step, with the trial court's
ultimate determination that a seizure did or did not occur. When re-
viewing this determination, some circuit courts employ the clearly er-
roneous standard of review, whereas others employ the de novo
standard of review. 6 In Section B, I shall examine the arguments for
the clearly erroneous standard, and in Section C, I will examine the
arguments in favor of the de novo standard.
'0 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438; Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574, 575 n.7.
8' See Kidwell, supra note 33, at 136 (discussing the analysis conducted by a trial court to de-
termine whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred); see also 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16,
at 442 (summarizing the process a trial court takes to resolve any Fourth Amendment motion to
suppress).
82 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
83 See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 442 (concluding that there is no conflict over standards to
use for appellate review of findings of fact for any Fourth Amendment issue).
, United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Kidwell, supra note 33,
at 136 ("These findings, being devoid of any legal principle, are reviewed under the clearly er-
roneous standard.").
See cases cited supra notes 9-13.
See cases cited supra notes 14-20.
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B. Reasons that Appellate Review of Seizure Should Be the Clearly Erroneous
Standard
There are two interdependent reasons usually offered to support
the clearly erroneous standard. First, the clearly erroneous standard
is appropriate because the determination of seizure under the
Mendenhall test is so "fact-intensive... that the [trial] court's deter-
mination is essentially one of fact."
8 7
This fact-intensive nature of seizure determinations is openly rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, the
Court explained:
[I] n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a sei-
zure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the en-
counter to determine whether the police conduct would have communi-
cated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.88
Furthermore:
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coer-
cive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on
particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what consti-
tutes... [a seizure] will vary, not only with the particular police conduct
at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs. s9
Since the determination of seizure is fact-intensive, imprecise, and
depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen
encounter, a trial court is in the "best position to determine whether
a seizure occurred."0 A trial court considers all of the circumstances
"by conducting an evidentiary hearing at which it must resolve con-
flicts in testimony and determine the credibility of witnesses."9' Since
the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions depends on
the "respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate
courts, 9 2 the clearly erroneous standard seems warranted, and the
87 United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Smith, 423 F.3d at 36
(Lynch, J., dissenting) ("The seizure determination is... quite heavily at the fact end of the
spectrum."); United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., dissenting)
("Because a determination of whether a seizure has occurred is essentially a fact-based en-
deavor, appellate courts should not reverse the trial court's conclusion unless it is clearly erro-
neous.").
501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
McKines, 933 F.2d at 1422.
91 Id. at 1421.
92 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991).
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appellate court should defer to the trial court's determination of
whether a seizure occurred.
93
Second, de novo review appears to be "at odds"94 with the Su-
preme Court's directive that there is no "bright-line rule, 95 for deter-
mining when a seizure occurred. Instead, in each individual case, the
trial court is supposed to examine "'all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident' ''96 to determine whether a Fourth Amend-
ment seizure occurred.
The problem with de novo review is that appellate courts would
attach "talismanic legal significance to those factual details which
have recurred, 97 in some cases, and apply them to other similar cases.
Appellate courts, by their very nature, look to prior precedents to in-
vestigate whether similar factual circumstances have occurred, and
base their judgments on similarities or differences with these prece-
dents. Over time, this focus on relevant similarities and differences
would produce a set of factors that becomes dispositive in the deter-
mination of whether a seizure occurred.98 But this produces the sort
of "bright-line" test for determining when a seizure occurred that was
specifically rejected by the Court in Michigan v. Chesternut.99
The need to focus on all of the factual circumstances surrounding
a police-citizen encounter, and the rejection of any bright-line test,
suggests that the trial court is in the best position for seizure deter-
minations. The trial court can examine witnesses, observe their de-
meanors, and ultimately judge their credibility to conclude whether
an objective person would think that she was free to leave. Accord-
ingly, this suggests that clear error is the appropriate standard of re-
view, and that the appellate court should defer to the trial court.
Together, both reasons provide a somewhat plausible rationale for
using the clearly erroneous standard for appellate review. 00 Despite
" See supra text accompanying notes 62-72 (discussing how appellate standard of review for
mixed questions is often determined by which court is more competent to decide the question).
McKines, 933 F.2d at 1422.
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
439 (1991) (holding that per se rules are generally inappropriate for seizure determination).
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
543, 554 (1980)).
97 McKines, 933 F.2d at 1422 (citing United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Mikva,J., dissenting)).
98 See United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing the trend to-
wards finding certain factors more dispositive in determining seizure).
See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-74 (rejecting a bright-line test for determining seizure); see
also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203 (2002) (reversing appellate court for relying on
prior precedent and focusing on one factor in determining that a seizure occurred); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) ("We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distin-
guishing a consensual encounter from a seizure .. ").
' See generally Kidwell, supra note 33 (arguing that review of seizure should be clearly erro-
neous); Westby, supra note 64 (same).
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this, some circuits have held that de novo is the correct standard of
appellate review, and their arguments will be examined in the next
section.
C. Reasons that Appellate Review of Seizure Should Be De Novo
There are three main reasons offered to support de novo review
of seizure. First, despite never directly addressing the issue, the Su-
preme Court has "never deferred to the trier of fact regarding the
question of seizure."' ° ' Instead, the Court acts like a trial court by
analyzing "'all of the circumstances surrounding the incident ' '"0 2 to
determine whether a seizure occurred, and does not appear to defer
to the trial court's judgment.
In United States v. Drayton, for example, the Supreme Court re-
versed an appellate court's ruling that a seizure occurred when police
entered a bus to talk to an individual, and upheld the District Court's
determination that a seizure did not occur. 13 In doing so, the Court
did not mention the clearly erroneous standard, but simply asserted
that there were "ample grounds" for the District Court's finding that
a seizure did not occur. M 4 After making this statement, however, the
Court thoroughly analyzed the factual record and discussed prior Su-
preme Court seizure precedents to support its conclusion. 5  Al-
though not dispositive, this close analysis of the factual record and
discussion of prior precedent suggests that the "Court approached
the issue of seizure as one of law .... [and] clearly engaged in de
novo review ....
Second, the test for determining whether a seizure occurred is
supposed to be an "'objective legal test." 0 7 The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the test is imprecise and flexible, but it also "calls for
consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of
the particular individual's response to the actions of the police."'08
This consistent application "allows the police to determine in ad-
"'1 Maragh, 894 F.2d at 417.
,02 McKines, 933 F.2d at 1424 (quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572).
.0 536 U.S. at 204-05.
,o Id. at 204.
1o5 Id. at 204-06.
10 McKines, 933 F.2d at 1425 (Gibson, J., concurring) (inferring de novo review from a simi-
lar factual analysis in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)).
,07 Id. (quoting United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); United States v.
Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the test for determining seizure is
objective); Maragh, 894 F.2d at 417 (same); see also supra text accompanying notes 77-82 (dis-
cussing the standard for determining seizure).
I0 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (emphasis added).
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vance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth
Amendment."' 9
Since appellate courts are better at clarifying the law, " de novo
review would help "ensure consistent application" of this objective
test."' This suggests that the appropriate standard of appellate review
for seizure determinations should be de novo.112
Third, appellate courts have a "responsibility independently to
apply important constitutional standards .... that cannot be dele-
gated to the trier of fact."' 13 Although not explicitly stated, this is an
appeal to the Supreme Court's constitutional fact doctrine.14  Ac-
cording to this doctrine, appellate courts have a constitutional duty to
review de novo a lower court's factual findings in order to determine
whether a constitutional standard has been violated." 5
The precise scope of the constitutional fact doctrine is unclear,
but not every constitutional issue receives heightened appellate scru-
tiny with respect to the factual findings." 6 Instead, courts selectively
determine which rights require closer appellate supervision and
which ones do not."' Factual findings in cases with First Amendment
rights clearly receive heightened appellate scrutiny, ' 8 but factual find-
ings related to the following constitutional rights do not: a magis-
trate's finding that probable cause to issue a search warrant exists;" 9
109 Id.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 51-54; 67-70 (noting appellate courts are better at
clarifying the law than trial courts).
. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 418.
"1 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98 (1996) (arguing that the need for con-
sistent application of an objective standard is a reason for de novo review); infra notes 122-38
and accompanying text (discussing Ornelas).
Maragh, 894 F.2d at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See generally Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427 (2001) (discussing the constitutional fact doctrine);
Kidwell, supra note 33, at 140-48 (discussing the constitutional fact doctrine and its application
to the determination of Fourth Amendment seizure); Monaghan, supra note 20 (analyzing the
constitutional fact doctrine).
"s See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984) (hold-
ing that determination of actual malice in defamation action receives independent appellate
review because it depends on the construction of a constitutional principle).
116 See Hoffman, supra note 114 (discussing the scope of the constitutional fact doctrine);
Kidwell, supra note 33, at 140-48 (same); Monaghan, supra note 20, at 264-71 (same).
17 See Monaghan, supra note 20, at 266-67 (arguing that the Supreme Court is determining
which constitutional rights are subject to close appellate review and which ones are not "on an
ad hoc basis").
"s See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 ("The question... is not merely a question for the trier of
fact. Judges ... must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is suffi-
cient .... ").
"' See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-39 (1983) (holding that the determination of prob-
able cause by magistrate is reviewed deferentially on appeal).
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the decision that an object is obscene;20 and, in some instances, in-
terpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 121
Despite this appeal to the constitutional fact doctrine, the Su-
preme Court has never held that whether a seizure occurred is a con-
stitutional fact. Therefore, the applicability of this doctrine to sup-
port de novo review of Fourth Amendment seizure is uncertain, but it
offers a viable reason for holding this position.
Together, these reasons provide a plausible rationale for de novo
appellate review of seizure. And, when compared to the arguments
for the clearly erroneous standard, the circuit split on this issue is
understandable. There are good arguments for both sides, and there
are no obvious flaws with any of these arguments. But the Supreme
Court's decision that de novo review is the appropriate standard for
appellate review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion has an
important impact. Section III explores the reasoning behind this de-
cision and argues that this reasoning is directly applicable to appel-
late review of seizure, and that de novo is therefore the appropriate
standard.
III. ORNELAS V. UNITED STATES AND APPELLATE REVIEW OF SEIZURE
A. Ornelas v. United States
In Ornelas v. United States, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit
split over the proper standard of appellate review for trial court dis-
positions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.122 Prior to Or-
nelas, the circuit courts disagreed over whether appellate review of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion should be de novo or for
clear error.23 The Supreme Court resolved this dispute by holding
that appellate review should be de novo.
In Ornelas, the Court presented the following standard for deter-
mining probable cause or reasonable suspicion:
They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with the fac-
tual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973) (holding that the determination that an
object is obscene is reviewed deferentially on appeal).
21 See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534-37 41979) (applying the clearly-
erroneous standard when reviewing an equal protection challenge to segregation of public
schools).
22 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that determinations of reasonable suspicion and prob-
able cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal).
12 Compare, e.g., United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying de
novo review), with United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 268-71 (7th Cir. 1992) (employing
clear error standard of review).
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and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. As such, the standards are
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. We have
described reasonable suspicion simply as a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable
cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found. We have cautioned that
these two legal principles are not finely-tuned standards .... They are in-
stead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particu-
lar contexts in which the standards are being assessed.
1 4
When determining whether there is probable cause or reasonable
suspicion for a stop or a search, the trial court employs the same two-
step process used for assessing whether a seizure has occurred.
125
First, the court investigates the "events which occurred leading up to
the stop or search.' 26 These facts and events become the trial court's
findings of historic fact, and the appropriate standard of appellate re-




Second, the trial court must decide whether these facts, when
"viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police offi-
cer, amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause" 2 for con-
ducting the stop or search. As with seizure determinations, it was the
appellate court's review of this step that sparked the circuit split over
the appropriate standard of review. In resolving this controversy, the
Supreme Court offered three reasons for de novo appellate review of
the trial court's determination of probable cause and reasonable sus-
picion.
The first reason is the need for maintaining a unitary system of




The clearly erroneous standard is problematic with respect to this
goal because two trial courts, presented with essentially similar facts,
could draw completely different conclusions about whether "the facts
are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.' 3 ° This
type of variability is "unacceptable" for Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, and there needs to be a unitary system of laws and protec-
tions.13 ' De novo review helps eliminate this problem because deci-
sions by appellate courts are binding on lower courts, and appellate
124 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
" See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the two-step process used by trial
courts for assessing whether a seizure has occurred).
"' Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696.
121 Id. at 699.
121 Id. at 696.
22 Id. at 697 (stating that deference to the trial court "would be inconsistent with the idea of
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courts are better at researching precedents in order to try to elimi-
nate inconsistencies.
3 2
The second reason is that probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion are formless legal concepts that "acquire content only through
application.' 33  By this, the Court simply meant that there is no
bright-line rule for determining the meaning of these concepts, but
that they only acquire meaning by "application to the particular cir-
cumstances of a case." 34 With concepts like these, de novo review is
necessary so that appellate courts can fulfill their "primary function as
an expositor of law,' ' 35 and "maintain control of, and ... clarify, the
legal principles" that are involved. 36 If the appellate court deferred
to the trial court's ruling, then it cannot explain or clarify the law
unless the trial court made a clear error.
The third reason in favor of de novo review is that this form of re-
view can promote the goal of having constitutionally desirable police
practices. De novo review promotes this goal by unifying precedent
and providing a defined "'set of rules which, in most instances, makes
it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether
an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforce-
ment. 3 Unlike trial courts, appellate courts have the temperament
and capacity to provide consistency, which is needed to develop clear
rules that can be applied by law enforcement officers in order to
avoid Fourth Amendment violations. 3 Hence, de novo review of rea-
sonable suspicion and probable cause can help promote constitu-
tionally desirable police practices.
Together, all three reasons are a powerful argument for de novo
review, and elucidate the factors that the Supreme Court considers
important in determining the appropriate appellate standard of re-
view in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The next Section will
demonstrate that each of these reasons is equally applicable to the
determination of whether a seizure occurred. Appellate review of sei-
zure should also be de novo.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (discussing the institutional advantages of appel-
late courts with respect to matters of law).
... Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697.
'" Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
'5 Id.
'+ Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697.
Id. (quoting NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
.. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995) ("[T]he law declaration aspect of
independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.").
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B. Impact ofOrnelas v. United States on the Appellate Review of Seizure
The precedential value of Ornelas v. United States with respect to
the appropriate standard of review for Fourth Amendment seizure is
uncertain. Some circuits have cited Ornelas as authority, without any
explanation, for holding that appellate review of seizure is de novo.
Others have argued that the Ornelas holding only applies to appellate
review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and that the
clearly erroneous standard is the correct appellate standard of review
for seizure. 140
In this Section, I will not address whether Ornelas is binding prece-
dent with respect to the appellate standard of review for seizure, such
that it can be read to overrule those circuits which apply the clearly
erroneous standard. 1 4  Instead, I argue that the reasons offered in
Ornelas to justify de novo review are equally applicable to appellate
review of seizure, and provide a sound justification for de novo appel-
late review of whether a seizure occurred under the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The first reason given in Ornelas for de novo review was that appel-
late review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion promoted a
unitary system of laws that are consistently applied to all criminal de-
fendants to ensure similar constitutional protections. Deferential
review poses a problem because two trial courts can rely on similar
facts and reach different conclusions about whether a seizure oc-
curred. This type of variability was deemed "unacceptable" for prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion, so it seems equally unacceptable
with respect to seizure. Since appellate courts are better suited for
creating a unitary system of laws, this suggests that de novo review is
more appropriate.
One possible criticism is that uniformity in seizure determinations
is impossible due to the "factual nature of the seizure test." 43 As dis-
cussed previously, the determination of seizure is a "fact-intensive"
endeavor where the trial court examines all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the police-citizen encounter to assess whether a reasonable
'" See United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Ornelas to support
de novo review of seizure); United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (referenc-
ing Ornelas to support de novo appellate review of seizure).
' See United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Orneas does not
address appellate standard of review for seizure and that seizure should be reviewed for clear
error).
14 See supra notes 9-13 (listing circuit courts that apply the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view).
14 See supra text accompanying note 129 (citing Ornelas for the proposition that de novo ap-
pellate review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion promotes a unitary system of laws).
" Westby, supra note 64, at 859.
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person would have felt free to leave. 1" But, since there is endless
variation in the facts and circumstances surrounding these types of
cases, "[f]act bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through
appellate review, de novo or otherwise."' 45 Accordingly, any appellate
court decision about a seizure will not have precedential value be-
cause "[i] t is inconceivable that a future case would contain identical
facts." 4 6 Therefore, the desire for uniformity cannot justify de novo
review because there is no uniformity to be had in this area of the
law.
There are two problems with this criticism. First, while Justice
Scalia made a similar objection in his dissent to Ornelas,4 7 this objec-
tion was summarily dismissed by the majority.48 Unless there is good
reason to think that seizure is more fact-intensive than either prob-
able cause or reasonable suspicion, this criticism is ineffective.
Second, despite the fact-intensive nature of seizure determina-
tions, and the improbability of identical circumstances occurring,
similar circumstances can reoccur, and uniformity and consistency
are desirable for these circumstances. For example, in Florida v. Bos-
tick, the Supreme Court found that the circumstances of a police-
citizen encounter were "analytically indistinguishable" from the cir-
cumstances in INS v. Delgado14 for seizure purposes, and relied on this
prior precedent to find that no seizure occurred.150  Since certain
situations can reoccur, and appellate courts are better at ensuring
uniformity in the law, this seems like a legitimate reason to support
de novo appellate review of seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Another reason offered in Ornelas to support de novo review was
that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are formless concepts
that only acquire content by being applied to different factual cir-
cumstances.' There is no bright-line rule for determining the mean-
ing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and these concepts are
." See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing the fact-intensive nature of the seizure
test).
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
46 Westby, supra note 64, at 860.
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 703 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations are resistant to useful generalization).
. See id. at 698 (arguing that despite the fact-intensive multi-faceted probable cause and rea-
sonable suspicion inquiries, there is precedential value in prior cases and good reason for de
novo review).
49 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (finding no seizure even though, at the time they were ques-
tioned, workers were not free to leave the building because of their employment obligations).
" Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1996) (relying on Delgado to find there is no seizure
when the individual was restrained by a factor other than the police; in this case, he was on a
bus at the time of the questioning).
151 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.
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extremely context-dependent, imprecise, and flexible. 152 As a result,
de novo review ensures that appellate courts maintain their primary
role of stating and clarifying the law and legal principles.
The concept of seizure also reflects this same flexibility and con-
text-dependent features:
The test [for seizure] is necessarily imprecise because it is designed to assess
the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to fo-
cus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what
constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he
is not free to "leave" will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at is-153 -
sue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.
Accordingly, de novo review would ensure that appellate courts were
able to clarify and state the law concerning seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
One possible objection is that any form of de novo review is im-
plausible because the standard for seizure is so flexible and fact-
dependent that the Supreme Court has rejected any bright-line or per
se rules for determining when a seizure has occurred. 5  But this ob-
jection is hard to reconcile with the adoption of de novo review for
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. These concepts are also
"not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules," 55
but the Ornelas Court still thought they were amenable to de novo re-
view. Unless seizure is more flexible or context-dependent than ei-
ther of these two concepts, this objection is unsuccessful and does not
provide a good reason to reject de novo appellate review of seizure.
The third reason offered in Ornelas to support de novo review of
probable cause is that de novo review promotes constitutionally de-
sirable police practices.156 De novo review promotes this goal because
the primary function of appellate courts is to clarify and unify the
law, 7 and this type of clarity will create clearer standards that can
guide police officers and help them avoid violating a citizen's Fourth
Amendment rights.
This goal of promoting constitutionally desirable police practices
is also an important goal for the law behind seizure:
While the test [for seizure] is flexible enough to be applied to the whole
range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for
152 Id.
'" Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (emphasis added); see also supra text
accompanying notes 80-82 (discussing the objective standard for seizure).
l5 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
... Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
' See supra text accompanying notes 137-38 (discussing the third reason offered to support
de novo review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion).
.. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54; 67-72 (discussing the institutional advantages of
appellate courts).
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consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the
particular individual's response to the actions of the police. The test's
objective standard-looking to the reasonable man's interpretation of
the conduct in question-allows the police to determine in advance whether the
conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment.1
5
8
Since one goal behind the objective standard for seizure is to provide
rules that the police can use to guide their behavior, and de novo re-
view promotes this goal, this is another good reason for de novo re-
view of the trial court's determination of seizure.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellate standard of review for determining
whether a seizure occurred should be de novo. Seizure determina-
tions are mixed questions of fact and law, and the appropriate stan-
dard of review for mixed questions depends on which institution is
more competent and better suited to deciding the issue. 159 With re-
spect to seizure, the fact-intensive nature of this test has created a cir-
cuit split over whether a trial court or appellate court is best suited to
deciding this issue. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eight, and Eleventh
Circuits all hold that trial courts are better suited to deciding 6this is-
sue, and that appellate review should only be for clear error. 0 But,
the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits all
hold that appellate courts are better suited to deciding this issue, and
that appellate review should be de novo.161
Prior to Ornelas v. United States, there were plausible reasons in fa-
vor of both the clearly erroneous and the de novo standards of appel-
late review. 162 However, in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning
and holding in Ornelas, de novo review seems much more appropri-
ate. In Ornelas, the Supreme Court offered three reasons why the de-
termination of probable cause and reasonable suspicion should be
subject to de novo appellate review. 6 All three reasons are equally
applicable to the determination of whether a seizure occurred for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 164 Therefore, the determination
8 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
See supra Part L.A. (discussing different standards of review and mixed questions of fact
and law).
See supra notes 9-13 (listing cases that use the clearly erroneous standard).
,6, See supra notes 14-20 (listing cases that use the de novo standard).
"2 See supra Parts II.B-C (analyzing the arguments in favor of the clearly erroneous and de
novo standards of appellate review).
163 See supra Part III.A (discussing the three reasons why appellate review of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion should be de novo).
'" See supra Part II.B (arguing that the three reasons also apply to appellate review of
whether a seizure occurred).
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of whether a seizure occurred should also be subject to de novo ap-
pellate review.
